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Introduction
In a recently published and widely disseminated arti-
cle, SethWynes and Kimberly Nicholas (2017) identify
lifestyle choices that reduce individual greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and quantify the GHG reductions
of each such choice for high-carbon individuals in
developed countries. They also show that policy mak-
ers and educators fail to recommend high-impact
actions over lower-impact actions. The most strik-
ing example of a high-impact action that is largely
neglected in recommendations, according to the study,
is having one fewer child.
Wynes and Nicholas argue that this choice is vastly
more significant than any other choice that an individ-
ual couldmake. For example, ‘aUS family who chooses
to have one fewer child would provide the same level of
emissions reductions as 684 teenagers who choose to
adopt comprehensive recycling for the rest of their lives’
(Wynes and Nicholas 2017). Although we do not dis-
pute the potentially high impact on GHG emissions of
a decision to have a child, we shall raise a method-
ological concern about attributing responsibility
for its consequences in the way that the authors do.
From ‘carbon legacy’ to action
recommendations: the problem of double
counting
The decision to have a child sets in motion a causal
chain that is likely to create additional GHG emis-
sions. But this is not to say that the individual that
makes the decision is thereby responsible, in the rel-
evant way, for all emissions that follow from it. It is
important to point out the obvious here: GHG emis-
sions aremainly and directly caused by burning of fossil
fuels, everything else just makes thatmore or less likely.
If one is attributing responsibility—as one is when
making normative recommendations in government
documents and textbooks—the focus should be on
actions that are under the control of the individual
agent and which, with a significant probability, con-
tribute to the undesired outcome. It is not clear that
the decision to have a child falls under this category of
actions.
Consider the example of air travel. Emissions from
air travel could be thought of as the result of an individ-
ual deciding to travel by airplane but also as a result of
that individual’s parents deciding to have her at some
prior point in time. Who, then, is responsible and who
should be held accountable for the unwanted conse-
quences? The individual, the parents, or both? The
latter answer gives rise to a problem of multiple count-
ing which is in tension with the objectives of Wynes’s
and Nicholas’ study.
Wynes and Nicholas draw on an article by Mur-
taugh and Schlax (2009), who seek to quantify the
‘carbon legacy’ of individuals in theworld’smost popu-
lated countries, that is, the contribution that individual
reproductive choices make to climate change. Their
basic assumption is that an individual is responsible for
her own emissions as well as for the emissions of her
descendants in proportion to their relatedness to her.
The relatedness is weighted by a fraction of ‘genetic
units’—the proportion of an individual’s genes that
she shares with the descendant in question. For a given
individual, the fraction of genetic units that she shares
with her offspring is 1/2, the fraction of genetic units
she shares with her offspring’s offspring, 1/4, and so
on. Thus, in general, the weighted relatedness of an
individual to a given ancestor is (1/2)ˆn, where n is
the number of generations the individual in question is
removed from the ancestor.
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Within this framework of genetic relatedness,Mur-
taugh and Schlax define the carbon legacy of an
individual. An individual’s carbon legacy is the sum of
the carbon emitted by that individual and by each of her
descendants weighted by the fraction of genetic units
that they share with her. Calculating the carbon legacy
of a contemporary individual thus requires estimat-
ing future average fertility rates, and projected carbon
emissions of individuals in different countries, which
of course is subject to considerable uncertainty.Wewill
come back to this difficulty below; leaving it aside for
now. The problem is thatMurtaugh and Schlax identify
a person’s responsibility for carbon emissions with her
carbon legacy.
This identification has an undesirable consequence
for attributing responsibility for carbon emissions.
From the identification and the formula for calculating
carbon legacies it follows that, if we pick an individual,
x, she is fully responsible for her own carbon emissions
(responsibility (1/2)ˆ0 = 1); half responsible for the car-
bon emissions of her children ((1/2)ˆ1 = 1/2); a quarter
responsible for her grandchildren ((1/2)ˆ2 = 1/4), and
so on. What about the responsibility of x’s descen-
dants? Under the plausible assumption that there is
nothing special about x, or x’s generation, the same
calculation applies. So, if we fix one of x’s chil-
dren, y, this individual is fully responsible for his
own carbon emissions, half responsible for those of
his children, and so on.
This shows that the total share of responsibil-
ity is overdetermined. Although y is fully responsible
for his emissions, x is also partly responsible for y’s
emissions, and y’s parents taken together are fully
responsible for his emissions. Generalising the analysis,
the members of a generation X are fully responsi-
ble for the emissions of their successive generation,
Y (and in fact, of all successive generations), though
the members of Y are also fully responsible for their
own emissions. Hence, the analysis invokes multi-
ple counting of shares of responsibility for emissions:
for a given generation, every preceding generation is
fully responsible for that generation’s emissions.
Is it desirable and possible to avoid double
counting?
Is it a problem to say that responsibility for emissions
is overdetermined through individual’s decisions to,
say, have a child and that child’s decision to take a
long-distance flight? This depends onwhat the purpose
of the exercise is. Double counting is, for instance,
perfectly fine when it comes to counting genes: the
fact that an individual’s genes are also a mix of her
parents’ genes is apparently without problem. Perhaps
it is a different matter with responsibility, but again,
it depends on the objective of the calculation.
If the objective is to distribute compensation
to future victims of climate change, it is certainly
problematic to double count: there is a fixed amount
that is owed and it should only be paid once, by
the one/s responsible for the wrong. (Note that the
responsibility could be shared by several individuals
without double counting, as when a car is shared.)
But responsibility can also be used in a different sense,
when one is interested in picking out the agents whose
actions are suitably related in the causal chain likely
to produce the unwanted event. This then specifies
a reason for them to stop acting in those ways. But
which actions in current fossil fuel societies are not
involved in such causal chains, and how should their
relative importance be determined? The purpose of
making recommendations to individuals as to what
actions they should take in relation to climate change
is not clear.
Consider some ways of avoiding double counting
of responsibilities for emissions. One possibility is to let
the current generation bear full responsibility for their
carbon legacy. Any carbon emissions that occur in the
future would then fall back on this generation. But
while this solves the problem of double counting, it is
an undesirable solution. It would require an argument
as to why it is that the current generation is the spe-
cial one that shoulders the main share of responsibility
and it would free future generations from responsi-
bility for their emissions. But surely future lifestyle
choices, for example, the choice to eat meat or take
long distance flights etc., must be attributable to the
individuals making those decisions and not to their
far-off ancestors.
Another possibility is a kind of compromise. Par-
ents could be counted responsible for the emissions
caused by their children up to their legal age, after
which they themselves would be responsible. Once
an individual reaches the age at which she is enti-
tled to vote, and of criminal responsibility, she is also
fully responsible for her emissions. As for grandchil-
dren, their emissions will be the responsibility of their
parents, not of their grandparents, unless their par-
ents have themselves not reached legal age when they
have the children.
This is an improvement, but perhaps it comes at the
cost of effectively nullifying the idea of responsibility for
reproductive choices. This is because, while an individ-
ual would be responsible for their children’s emissions
up to the age of 18, one would also have to discount
that individual’s emissions up until they were 18. The
effect is that a couple with two children is responsi-
ble for the same number of emission-producing years
as before, with the difference being that those years
do not begin when they are born, but when they
are of legal age, and, furthermore, include 18 years
of their children’s emission-producing years. Note
though that more children do mean more emissions
attributed under this proposal. But it is an open ques-
tion whether ‘having one fewer child’ would count as
a high-impact action. This in turn depends on what
other lifestyle choices you make for your children,
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for example, whether or how often they embark on
transatlantic flights.
Responsibility is sensitive to emission
trajectories
The impact of having a child on GHG emissions
depends on other lifestyle choices and technologies.
This brings us to our final point. Anthropogenic GHG
emissions are a function of the global population, as
well as consumption and technologies. These variables
interact. If the world succeeds in transitioning to a
net-zero carbon economy in due time, the popula-
tion variable will become less relevant. More people
will, of course, strain the planet in other ways, such
as reducing biodiversity, and perhaps put additional
pressure on negative emission technologies. Never-
theless, having fewer children would have a much
lower impact on future emissions than in overshoot
scenarios. But Wynes and Nicholas implicitly exclude
scenarios in which global emission trajectories become
net-zero, or negative4. Investigating the implications
of having children with regards to the full range
of different scenarios, including likelihood analyses,
calls for further studies.
Conclusion
Wynes and Nicholas’s article is an important contri-
bution to the formulation of meaningful individual
climate mitigation recommendations. However, we
have argued that the attribution of responsibility
Wynes and Nicholas invoke involves a kind of mul-
tiple counting which runs counter to the objectives
of the study. This may distort recommendations from
policy makers and educators who rely on their study.
4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
While we have focussed on a methodological issue,
the extent to which recommendations are feasible and
will be adopted must also be taken into account (cf.
Dietz et al 2009). The recommendation to have fewer
children may be difficult in this respect (Stern and
Wolske 2017). The design of feasible policies that
are based on sound methodology calls for further
research.
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